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Abstract 
We investigate the environmental impacts of several forms of policies that offer 
farmers subsides in return for adoption of conservation tillage. The policies differ on 
whether the tillage practice or one of the environmental benefits is targeted. We develop 
an environmental Lorenz curve that fully represents the performance of the targeting 
policies, and we show that these curves can be used directly to help select the optimal 
targeting strategy for special classes of social welfare functions. We apply the model to 
the state of Iowa. 
 
Keywords: environmental Lorenz curve, multiple benefits of conservation tillage, 
targeting subsidy policy. 
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Introduction 
Improving the environmental performance of agriculture has emerged as an impor-
tant goal of U.S. agricultural policy. One potential tool for achieving this is the use of 
green payments, which are the payments made to farmers for environmentally friendly 
practices. Notably, conservation payments apply to changes in practices on land that 
remains in active production of agricultural commodities. Thus, green payments have the 
potential to be a major policy response to non-point source pollution from agriculture. 
Policymakers need to understand the environmental effectiveness of these policies as 
well as the costs associated with their use.  
Conservation tillage can generate a range of (mostly) positive environmental exter-
nalities related to water quality, wildlife habitat, and carbon sequestration. However, 
different land characteristics will yield different amounts of these environmental benefits. 
Thus, which land is most desirable for placement into conservation tillage depends in part 
on how society values different environmental benefits of the practice. This raises the 
question of whether specific environmental attributes should be targeted in the design of 
conservation payment programs and the degree to which there are trade-offs between 
these environmental benefits. For example, if a policy that targets carbon sequestration is 
implemented, how much less nitrogen runoff reduction is achieved than if nitrogen 
reductions were targeted?   
In this study, we compare empirically the environmental consequences of alternative 
conservation policies under which farmers are offered payments in return for their 
adoption of conservation tillage. The policies differ in which of the multiple environ-
mental benefits is targeted, that is, according to what environmental criterion the farmers 
are enrolled in the program. We develop a form of environmental Lorenz curve (ELC) to 
formally compare the alternative policies. The ELC is similar to, but different from, those 
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used in Babcock et al. 1996 and 1997a. The curves developed in this paper relate not only 
to the heterogeneity of the farms, as in Babcock et al., but also to the rank correlation of 
the different environmental services provided by the (heterogeneous) farms. We further 
show that for certain special social welfare functions, the ELCs can be used directly to 
help choose the optimal targeting strategy. 
 
A Conceptual Model of Targeting and Environmental Lorenz Curves 
There are N  farms of equal size, normalized to one acre. Currently the farmers are 
using a certain production practice, say, conventional tillage. An alternative practice, for 
example, conservation tillage, will affect a range of environmental amenities, indexed by 
1,...,k K . In particular, the environmental improvements of farm n  are represented by 
1( ,..., )n n nKX X X . Let nc  be the cost of adopting the new practice, that is, farmer n will 
enroll if he receives payments of at least nc  and will not enroll otherwise. Letting 
/n n nk kx X c , then the environmental improvement per dollar spent on farm n  is 
1( ,..., )n n nKx x x .  
Given a total budget of C , the government agency chooses which farms to enroll 
(i.e., which farms will be paid for adopting conservation tillage), in order to maximize the 
social welfare function 1( ,..., )KU X X . Here
e
i
k k
i
X X
 
  , with e  indexing the set of 
farmers adopting conservation tillage, and ( )U   is increasing and concave in kX .1 Let 
{1,..., }N   be the set of all farms and    be the  -algebra of the subsets of  . Then 
formally, the government’s problem is   
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 (1) 
which can be rewritten as 
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To solve (2), consider a hypothetical farm m  at the margin: the government is indif-
ferent as to whether this farm should be enrolled or not. Forming the Lagrangian 
( ) ( )n
n
L U C c    , the optimization condition is 1 1m m m m mK KU c x U c x c  , 
where /k kU U X   . That is, for the marginal farm m , we have  
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Since kU  measures the marginal utility of improving the kth environmental amenity, 
the government should rank the farms by their aggregate environmental contribution per 
dollar spent, or n nk kkv U x , n , and enroll farms from the highest nv  until the 
budget C  is exhausted. Let *( )e C  denote the optimal set of farmers enrolled given the 
budget C . Note that if the government has a sufficiently big budget, all farms will be 
enrolled. That is, there exists a budget level C  such that *( )e C   for all C C
 . 
If the “prices” kU , or the marginal social benefits of the environmental amenities, 
are easily obtainable, the previous rule dictates an optimal targeting strategy for the 
government: it should target the comprehensive per-dollar environmental benefit v . 
However, targeting multiple amenities may push the transaction costs too high, and the 
government may choose to target a particular amenity. Suppose the government chooses 
to target kX . We can show that the optimal solution is then to enroll farmers from the 
highest nkx  until budget C is exhausted.  
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Let ( )ek C  denote the set of farmers enrolled when targeting amenity kX  given 
budget C , and let 
, ( )
ˆ ( ) e
k
n
l k ln C
X C X
 
  be the total amenity lX  supplied by these 
enrolled farmers, , 1,...,k l K . The efficiency of targeting kX  relative to the optimal 
targeting is given by 
 
 
 * *
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 (3) 
If the government chooses to target only one environmental amenity, it should select the 
one with the highest ( )k C . Again, since the government can enroll all farms with 
budget C , we know that ( ) 1k C  , 1,...,k K  . 
Typically, the social welfare function ( )U   is unknown and the “prices” of the envi-
ronmental amenities kU  are not easily obtainable. Suppose the government intends to 
target only one of the environmental amenities directly. Which one should it target? What 
are the “externalities” of the policy in terms of the other environmental amenities? We 
will show in what follows that the externalities of the targeting policies can be described 
by ELCs. Further, under certain normalization conditions these curves can also aid the 
choice of the optimal targeting strategies for given classes of the welfare function ( )U  .  
Effects of Targeting Strategies: Environmental Lorenz Curves 
Let 
, , ,
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) / ( )l k l k l lw C X C X C  be the ratio of the lth amenity achieved under targeting 
strategy kX  relative to that under targeting lX , given C . The comprehensive performance 
of strategy kX  can be represented by a vector 1, ,( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))k k K kw C w C w C . Since the 
highest level of lX  is achieved when lX  is targeted, , ( ) [0,1]l kw C  , 1,...,l K . Roughly 
speaking, given C , as kw  increases, targeting kX  is preferred, as its performance in raising 
other amenities increases relative to targeting those amenities directly.  
We call ( )kw C  a function of C , the ELC associated with targeting kX . Its specific 
profile depends on the rank correlation of the environmental amenities across the farms. 
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Let 1( ,..., )Nk k kx x x  be the farm profile of environmental amenity kX , and let kr  be the 
associated rank order. If kr , 1,...,k K , are perfectly correlated, farms that provide more 
amenity lX  per dollar spent also provide more kX . Then ( ) (1,...,1)kw C  : the same 
farms will be selected under any of the targeting strategies, resulting in an amenity ratio 
of one for all 1,...,k K . Also, note that in this case 1k  . Perfect correlation of the 
rank order can be a result of stronger conditions, such as the perfect correlation of 
kx , 1,...,k K , or that the farms are homogeneous (i.e., i jk kx x , , 1,...,i j N ). However, 
correlation among kr , 1,...,k K , is different from correlation among 
nx , 1,...,n N , and 
the latter (with K=1, or only one environmental benefit considered) is what is driving the 
Lorenz curves in Babcock et al. (1996, 1997a). Even if farms are extremely heterogene-
ous, there may still be a high rank order correlation among kr , 1,...,k K , if lands in the 
region with high amenities in some aspects also provide high amenities in other aspects. 
Note that when C C , all farms are enrolled under any targeting strategy. Then, re-
gardless of the correlation among kr , we know that ( ) (1,...,1)kw C  . As C  decreases, 
,l kw  tends to decrease for l k , as increasingly different farms will be enrolled under the 
two targeting strategies. 
Choices of Targeting Strategies: Normalized Lorenz Curves 
As shown in equation (3), choosing the optimal targeting strategy requires informa-
tion about the social welfare function ( )U  . We now consider two special classes of 
welfare functions:  
 1
1
( ,..., )
K
K k k
k
U X X X
 
  (4) 
and 
 1( ,..., ) min{ , 1,..., }K k kU X X X k K  . (5) 
In the first case, the environmental amenities are perfect substitutes, while they are 
perfect complements in the second case. Further, we normalize the weights as 
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 k
kX

  , (6) 
where nk knX X   is the total environmental amenity k  that is provided by all of the 
farms. Note that kX  can be achieved under any targeting strategies: ,ˆ ( )k l kX C X  for 
all 1,...,l K . The normalization in (6), together with (4) and (5), implies that when the 
environment is restored to its “pristine” state, or when all the environmental services of 
the land have been restored, that is, k kX X  for all k , each pristine amenity has the 
same “value”  . Under both (4) and (5), society views these amenities equally at the 
pristine state.  
Let 
, ,
ˆ( ) ( ) /k l k l kC X C X   be the ratio of the kth amenity that can be achieved under 
targeting strategy lX , relative to the maximum possible amenity level, and let 
1, ,( ) ( ( ),..., ( ))l l K lC C C    be the vector of amenity ratios achievable under this strategy. 
Then the utility levels of targeting lX  under (4) and (5) are, respectively, 
 
, ,
1
( ) ( );            ( ) min{ ( ), 1,..., }
K
l k l l k l
k
V C C V C C k K   
 
   . (7) 
The optimal targeting strategy given budget level C  is to select the maximum from 
{ ( ), 1,..., }lV C l K . 
Note that 
, , ,
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) /k l k l k k kC w C X C X  . Tracing out ( )l C  for [0, ]C C , we obtain 
a normalized ELC, which is ELC ( )lw C  rescaled by ,ˆ ( ) /k k kX C X . For each targeting 
strategy, the two payoff functions in (7) correspond to the vertical summation of the 
curves and the minimum of the normalized ELC curves, respectively. The optimal 
targeting strategy then can be chosen by comparing the summed or minimum curves of 
all strategies. Figure 1 illustrates such choices when two environmental benefits are being 
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FIGURE 1. The choice of optimal targeting strategy 
 
considered, lX  and kX , for a given budget 
*C = 20. In this figure,  * *, ,1/ 2 ( ) ( )l l k lC C   
>  * *, ,1/ 2 ( ) ( )k k l kC C  ; thus, targeting benefit lX  is preferred under the assumption of 
perfect substitutability. However,    * * * *, , , ,min ( ), ( ) min ( ), ( )k k l k l l k lC C C C    , 
meaning that targeting benefit kX  is the optimal choice under perfect complementarity. 
 
Application: Conservation Tillage in Iowa 
We apply our model to conservation tillage in the state of Iowa, with each of the 
12,143N   National Resource Inventory (NRI) (Nusser and Goebel 1997) points repre-
senting a farm. The costs of adoption, nc , 1,...,n N , are obtained from Kurkalova, 
Kling, and Zhao 2003, which presents a methodology and empirical estimates of a 
reduced form, discrete-choice adoption model for Iowa. Here, we briefly summarize this 
model and explain how we use it.  
The conservation tillage adoption model in Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2003 is 
derived under the assumption that a farmer will adopt conservation tillage if the 
expected annual net return from conservation tillage exceeds that from conventional 
tillage plus a premium associated with uncertainty. The premium in turn depends on 
the variability of the net returns to conservation tillage and conventional tillage, and 
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other explanatory variables. Given per-acre subsidy nc , the model returns the adop-
tion probability,    ,n nn np c p c s , where ( )p   is logistic, and vector ns  is a 
collection of producer and site-specific variables, including the production site’s 
physical and climatic characteristics, the crop grown, farmer characteristics, as well 
as the expected net return to conventional tillage. This adoption model is estimated on 
a random sub-sample of NRI points located in Iowa. In the empirical implementation, 
we slightly modify the model described earlier to account for the continuous probabil-
ity of adoption. 
The basic data come from the 1992 NRI (USDA-SCS 1994). The NRI data are statis-
tically reliable for national, state, and multi-county analysis of non-federal land (Nusser 
and Goebel 1997) and thus are reasonably representative of Iowa agricultural land. In our 
calculations, we treat each NRI point as representing a producer with a farm size equal to 
the number of acres represented by the point (the NRI expansion factor). The NRI 
provides information on the natural resource characteristics of the land and the crop 
grown (1992 and 1991 seasons). For additional information on the data source and 
model, see Kurkalova, Kling, and Zhao 2003. 
The field-specific environmental benefits from conservation tillage, 
, 1,..., , 1,..., ,KnX k K n N   are estimated at each of the data points using the Environ-
mental Policy Integrated Climate (EPIC) model version 1015 (Izaurralde et al. 2002).2 
We consider 4K   environmental benefits, including carbon sequestration, nitrogen 
runoff reduction, reduction in water erosion, and reduction in wind erosion. EPIC is a 
commonly used simulation model adaptable for large regional analyses (e.g., Plantinga 
and Wu 2003; Babcock et al. 1997b). The simulations are carried out at a field-scale level 
for areas homogeneous in weather, soil, landscape, crop rotation, and management 
system parameters. EPIC operates on a continuous basis using a daily time step and is 
capable of simulating multi-year periods. The model accounts for the effects of tillage on 
surface residue, soil bulk density, and mixing of residue and nutrients in the soil plow 
layer. Version 1015 of EPIC includes an updated (relative to earlier versions) carbon 
simulation routine that is based on the approach used in the Century model developed by 
Parton et al. (1994).  
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At each of the data points, two 30-year simulations are run, one assuming conventional 
tillage and the other assuming conservation tillage. The NRI database provides baseline 
land use and other input data for the simulations. The quantities of the four environmental 
benefits are computed as the differences between appropriate EPIC outputs under conserva-
tion tillage and that under conventional tillage, averaged over the 30 years. 
 
Results 
We estimated the four categories of environmental benefits obtainable under five 
targeting strategies at 40 budget levels roughly corresponding to the amount of federal 
funding potentially available to Iowa through the Conservation Security Program.3  In 
addition to policies that target each one of the four environmental benefits previously 
listed, we also consider a practice-based policy that maximizes the number of acres of 
land in conservation tillage, enrolling low-cost farms first regardless of their environ-
mental benefits. Figure 2 presents the ELCs associated with this practice-based policy. 
From Figure 2, we see that the practice-based policy provides high proportions of the 
benefits obtainable from the policies that target the respective benefits. Note that the 
ELCs are increasing and concave in the budget level. 
To aid comparison of alternative targeting schemes, Figures 3 through 6 present re-
spectively the ELCs of the benefits when targeting carbon, nitrogen runoff, water erosion, 
and wind erosion. Again, the ELCs are increasing and concave in the budget. Note from 
Figures 3 and 4 that even at low budget levels, more than 40 percent of the potentially 
obtainable benefits from direct targeting can be achieved with the policies that target 
carbon sequestration or nitrogen runoff. Further, Figures 2 through 6 illustrate that more 
than 40 percent of the potentially obtainable carbon from direct carbon targeting can be 
achieved with the policies that target conservation tillage or the other benefits in question. 
These results indicate high correlation among the benefits considered, as well as high 
correlation between the benefits and the acreage in conservation tillage. Further, since 
high proportions of environmental benefits are obtained under the practice-based policy, 
the farms are relatively homogeneous in their land characteristics. Finally, from the  
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FIGURE 2. The environmental Lorenz curves associated with the practice-based 
policy   
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Environmental Lorenz curves associated with carbon targeting  
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FIGURE 4. Environmental Lorenz curves associated with nitrogen runoff targeting 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 5. Environmental Lorenz curves associated with water erosion targeting 
 
12 / Zhao, Kling, and Kurkalova 
 
FIGURE 6. Environmental Lorenz curves associated with wind erosion targeting 
 
figures, we see that carbon sequestration is correlated mostly with conservation tillage 
acreage: targeting either one provides high proportions of the other attribute. 
Now we investigate which of the single-benefit targeting policies is most desirable 
under the special social welfare functions previously given. Under the equal weights 
criterion (or when the environmental benefits are perfect substitutes), the policymaker 
chooses a policy that provides the highest percentage of the normalized total achiev-
able benefits. Under the max-min criterion (or when the benefits are perfect 
complements), the policymaker chooses the policy that provides the greatest level of 
the minimum percentage. Table 1 gives summaries of the estimated choices of the 
policies. We find that the choices of the best policies under the two criteria depend on 
the level of conservation budget. 
 
TABLE 1. Best targeting strategies under alternative social welfare functions 
Budget 
(Million $) Benefits are Perfect Substitutes Benefits are Perfect Complements 
2-36 Minimize nitrogen runoff Minimize nitrogen runoff 
38-70 Minimize nitrogen runoff Maximize carbon sequestration 
72-80 Maximize carbon sequestration Maximize carbon sequestration 
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Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the environmental impacts of several forms of policies 
that offer farmers subsides in return for adoption of conservation tillage. The policies 
differ on whether the tillage practice or one of the environmental benefits is targeted. We 
develop an ELC that fully represents the performance of the targeting policies and show 
that these curves can be used directly to help select the optimal targeting strategy for 
special classes of social welfare functions. 
We apply the model to the state of Iowa and find that the practice-based policy that 
targets conservation tillage acreage provides high proportions of the four benefits relative 
to the policies that target the benefits directly, especially at high budget levels. When the 
environmental benefits are perfect substitutes or complements, the optimal targeting 
strategy depends on the budget level. For intermediate budget levels (e.g., between $38 
and $70 million), nitrogen runoff and carbon sequestration respectively are the optimal 
targeting strategies. 
It must be noted, however, that our empirical results are based on EPIC, which pro-
vides the estimates of environmental benefits at the edge of the field and does not account 
for spatial movement of sediment and nutrients in drainage areas. While this feature of 
EPIC does not pose a limitation in the case of carbon sequestration for the reduction of 
greenhouse gases (see, e.g., the discussion in Antle and Mooney 2002), a desirable 
extension of our study would involve a more spatially explicit model for benefits related 
to water quality. 
  
Endnotes 
1. For simplicity, we define the social welfare as a function of the environmental im-
provements. Strictly, it should depend on the environmental levels, which are the sum 
of the improvements and the base levels, e.g., 1 1( ,..., )K kU Y X Y X  , where the Y’s 
are the base levels. Introducing these base levels will not affect our results. 
 
2. Earlier versions of EPIC were called the Erosion Productivity Impact Calculator 
(Williams 1990). 
 
3. The Conservation Security Program of the 2002 farm bill provides $2 billion for five 
years (U.S. Congress, 2002). Even if Iowa crop producers get as much as one-fifth of 
the yearly total, the program funding is limited to $80 million per year. 
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